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This paper  offers an  active  inference  account  of choice  behaviour  and  learning.  It focuses  on  the  distinc-
tion  between  goal-directed  and  habitual  behaviour  and  how  they  contextualise  each  other.  We  show
that  habits  emerge  naturally  (and  autodidactically)  from  sequential  policy  optimisation  when  agents
are  equipped  with  state-action  policies.  In active  inference,  behaviour  has  explorative  (epistemic)  and
exploitative  (pragmatic)  aspects  that  are  sensitive  to ambiguity  and  risk  respectively,  where  epistemic
(ambiguity-resolving)  behaviour  enables  pragmatic  (reward-seeking)  behaviour  and  the subsequent
emergence  of  habits.  Although  goal-directed  and  habitual  policies  are  usually  associated  with  model-based
and model-free  schemes,  we  ﬁnd  the  more  important  distinction  is  between  belief-free  and  belief-based
schemes.  The  underlying  (variational)  belief  updating  provides  a  comprehensive  (if  metaphorical)  pro-oal-directed
ree energy
nformation gain
ayesian surprise
pistemic value
xploration
cess  theory  for several  phenomena,  including  the  transfer  of  dopamine  responses,  reversal  learning,  habit
formation  and  devaluation.  Finally,  we show  that active  inference  reduces  to a classical  (Bellman)  scheme,
in the absence  of  ambiguity.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd. This  is an open  access  article  under  the  CC BY  license
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gramming schemes for Markovian decision processes that are cast
in terms of value-functions – and how the ensuing value (or policy)
iteration schemes can be understood in terms of active inference.References  . .  . . . . . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . . .  .  . . . . . .  . . . .  . . . .  . . .  .  . . .  .  .  . .  .  .  . .  .  . .  .  . . .  .  .  . . . . 
. Introduction
There are many perspectives on the distinction between goal-
irected and habitual behaviour (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998; Yin
nd Knowlton, 2006; Keramati et al., 2011; Dezfouli and Balleine,
013; Dolan and Dayan, 2013; Pezzulo et al., 2013). One popular
iew rests upon model-based and model-free learning (Daw et al.,
005, 2011). In model-free approaches, the value of a state (e.g.,
eing in a particular location) is learned through trial and error,
hile actions are chosen to maximise the value of the next state (e.g.
eing at a rewarded location). In contrast, model-based schemes
ompute a value-function of states under a model of behavioural
ontingencies (Gläscher et al., 2010). In this paper, we  consider a
elated distinction; namely, the distinction between policies that
est upon beliefs about states and those that do not. In other words,
e consider the distinction between choices that depend upon a
free energy) functional of beliefs about states, as opposed to a
value) function of states.
Selecting actions based upon the value of states only works
hen the states are known. In other words, a value function is only
seful if there is no ambiguity about the states to which the value
unction is applied. Here, we consider the more general problem
f behaving under ambiguity (Pearson et al., 2014). Ambiguity is
haracterized by an uncertain mapping between hidden states and
utcomes (e.g., states that are partially observed) – and generally
alls for policy selection or decisions under uncertainty; e.g. (Alagoz
t al., 2010; Ravindran, 2013). In this setting, optimal behaviour
epends upon beliefs about states, as opposed to states per se. This
eans that choices necessarily rest on inference, where optimal
hoices must ﬁrst resolve ambiguity. We will see that this reso-
ution, through epistemic behaviour, is an emergent property of
active) inference under prior preferences or goals. These prefer-
nces are simply outcomes that an agent or phenotype expects
o encounter (Friston et al., 2015). So, can habits be learned in an
mbiguous world? In this paper, we show that epistemic habits
merge naturally from observing the consequences of (one’s own)
oal-directed behaviour. This follows from the fact that ambiguity
an be resolved, unambiguously, by epistemic actions.
To illustrate the distinction between belief-based and belief-free
olicies, consider the following examples: a predator (e.g., an owl)
as to locate a prey (e.g., a ﬁeld mouse). In this instance, the best
oal-directed behaviour would be to move to a vantage point (e.g.,
verhead) to resolve ambiguity about the prey’s location. The corre-
ponding belief-free policy would be to ﬂy straight to the prey, from
ny position, and consume it. Clearly, this belief-free approach will
nly work if the prey reveals its location unambiguously (and the
wl knows exactly where it is). A similar example could be a preda-
or waiting for the return of its prey to a waterhole. In this instance,
he choice of whether to wait depends on the time elapsed since the
rey last watered. The common aspect of these examples is that the
elief state of the agent determines the optimal behaviour. In the
rst example, this involves soliciting cues from the environment
hat resolve ambiguity about the context (e.g., location of a prey).
n the second, optimal behaviour depends upon beliefs about the
ast (i.e., memory). In both instances, a value-function of the states
f the world cannot specify behaviour, because behaviour depends
n beliefs or knowledge (i.e., belief states as opposed to states of the
orld). . . .  . . .  . . .  . .  .  . . . .  . . .  . .  . . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  . .  .  . . . .  .  . .  . . .  .  .  .  . .  . . . . .  . . . . .  .  .  .  .  . .  .  .  .  .  .  . 878
Usually, in Markov decision processes (MDP), belief-based prob-
lems call for an augmented state-space that covers the belief or
information states of an agent (Averbeck, 2015) – known as a belief
MDP  (Oliehoek et al., 2005). Although this is an elegant solution
to optimising policies under uncertainty about (partially observed)
states, the composition of belief states can become computation-
ally intractable; not least because belief MDPs are deﬁned over
a continuous belief state-space (Cooper, 1988; Duff, 2002; Bonet
and Geffner, 2014). Active inference offers a simpler approach by
absorbing any value-function into a single functional of beliefs.
This functional is variational free energy that scores the surprise
or uncertainty associated with a belief, in light of observed (or
expected) outcomes. This means that acting to minimise free
energy resolves ambiguity and realises unsurprising or preferred
outcomes. We  will see that this single objective function can be
unpacked in a number of ways that ﬁt comfortably with established
formulations of optimal choice behaviour and foraging.
In summary, schemes that optimise state-action mappings –
via a value-function of states – could be considered as habitual,
whereas goal-directed behaviour is quintessentially belief-based.
This begs the question as to whether habits can emerge under
belief-based schemes like active inference. In other words, can
habits be learned by simply observing one’s own  goal-directed
behaviour? We  show this is the case; moreover, habit formation
is an inevitable consequence of equipping agents with the hypoth-
esis that habits are sufﬁcient to attain goals. We illustrate these
points, using formal (information theoretic) arguments and simu-
lations. These simulations are based upon a generic (variational)
belief update scheme that shows several behaviours reminiscent
of real neuronal and behavioural responses. We highlight some of
these behaviours in an effort to establish the construct validity of
active inference.
This paper comprises four sections. The ﬁrst provides a descrip-
tion of active inference, which combines our earlier formulations
of planning as inference (Friston et al., 2014) with Bayesian model
averaging (FitzGerald et al., 2014) and learning (FitzGerald et al.,
2015a, 2015b). Importantly, action (i.e. policy selection), perception
(i.e., state estimation) and learning (i.e., reinforcement learning) all
minimise the same quantity; namely, variational free energy. In this
formulation, habits are learned under the assumption (or hypoth-
esis) there is an optimal mapping from one state to the next, that is
not context or time-sensitive.1 Our key interest was to see if habit-
learning emerges as a Bayes-optimal habitisation of goal-directed
behaviour, when circumstances permit. This follows a general line
of thinking, where habits are effectively learned as the invariant
aspects of goal-directed behaviour (Dezfouli and Balleine, 2013;
Pezzulo et al., 2013, 2014, 2015). It also speaks to the arbitration
between goal-directed and habitual policies (Lee et al., 2014). The
second section considers variational belief updating from the per-
spective of standard approaches to policy optimisation based on the
Bellman optimality principle. In brief, we will look at dynamic pro-1 Here, we  mean context insensitive in the sense of Thrailkill and Bouton (2015). In
other words, context refers to outcome contingencies; not the paradigmatic context.
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The third section uses simulations of foraging in a radial maze to
llustrate some key aspects of inference and learning; such as the
ransfer of dopamine responses to conditioned stimuli, as agents
ecome familiar with their environmental contingencies (Fiorillo
t al., 2003). The ﬁnal section considers context and habit learning,
oncluding with simulations of reversal learning, habit formation
nd devaluation (Balleine and Ostlund, 2007). The aim of these sim-
lations is to illustrate how the above phenomena emerge from a
ingle imperative (to minimise free energy) and how they follow
aturally from each other.
. Active inference and learning
This section provides a brief overview of active inference. The
ormalism used in this paper builds upon our previous treatments
f Markov decision processes (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013; Friston
t al., 2014, 2015; Pezzulo et al., 2015, 2016). Speciﬁcally, we  extend
equential policy optimisation to include action-state policies of
he sort optimised by dynamic programming and backwards induc-
ion (Bellman, 1952; Howard, 1960). Active inference is based upon
he premise that everything minimises variational free energy. This
eads to some surprisingly simple update rules for action, percep-
ion, policy selection, learning and the encoding of uncertainty (i.e.,
recision) that generalise established normative approaches.
In principle, the following scheme can be applied to any
aradigm or choice behaviour. Earlier applications have been
sed to model waiting games (Friston et al., 2013) the urn
ig. 1. The functional anatomy of belief updating: sensory evidence is accumulated to op
f  past (and future) states. This corresponds to state estimation under each policy the age
ortex  – possibly in combination with ventral striatum (van der Meer et al., 2012) – in ter
n  expectations about future states. Note that the explicit encoding of future states lends
een  evaluated, it is used to predict the subsequent hidden state through Bayesian model
ealise  the predicted state. Once an action has been selected, it generates a new observatio
natomy, in terms of belief updating.avioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879
task and evidence accumulation (FitzGerald et al., 2015a, 2015b),
trust games from behavioural economics (Moutoussis et al.,
2014; Schwartenbeck et al., 2015a, 2015b), addictive behaviour
(Schwartenbeck et al., 2015c), two-step maze tasks (Friston et al.,
2015) and engineering benchmarks such as the mountain car prob-
lem (Friston et al., 2012a). Empirically, it is has been used in the
setting of computational fMRI (Schwartenbeck et al., 2015a). More
generally, in theoretical biology, active inference is a necessary
aspect of any biological self-organisation (Friston, 2013), where free
energy reﬂects survival probability in an evolutionary setting (Sella
and Hirsh, 2005).
In brief, active inference separates the problems of optimising
action and perception by assuming that action fulﬁls predictions
based upon perceptual inference or state-estimation. Optimal pre-
dictions are based on (sensory) evidence that is evaluated in
relation to a generative model of (observed) outcomes. This allows
one to frame behaviour as fulﬁlling optimistic predictions, where
the inherent optimism is prescribed by prior preferences (Friston
et al., 2014). Crucially, the generative model contains beliefs about
future states and policies, where the most likely policies lead to
preferred outcomes. This enables action to realise preferred out-
comes, based on the assumption that both action and perception
are trying to maximise the evidence or marginal likelihood of the
generative model, as scored by variational free energy.
Fig. 1, provides an overview of active inference in terms of the
functional anatomy and processes implicit in the minimisation of
variational free energy. In brief, sensory evidence is accumulated to
timise expectations about the current state, which are constrained by expectations
nt entertainments. The quality of each policy is evaluated in the ventral prefrontal
ms of its expected free energy. This evaluation and the ensuing policy selection rest
 this scheme the ability to plan and explore. After the free energy of each policy has
 averaging (over policies). This enables an action to be selected that is most likely to
n and the cycle begins again. Fig. 2 illustrates the formal basis of this computational
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orm beliefs about the current state of the world. These beliefs are
onstrained by expectations of past (and future) states. This evi-
ence accumulation corresponds to state estimation under each
olicy the agent entertainments. The quality of each policy is then
valuated in terms of its expected free energy. The implicit policy
election therefore depends on expectations about future states
nder each policy, where the encoding of future states lends the
cheme an ability to plan and explore. After the free energies of
ach policy have been evaluated, they are used to predict the next
tate of the world, through Bayesian model averaging (over poli-
ies); in other words, policies that lead to preferred outcomes have
 greater inﬂuence on predictions. This enables action to realise pre-
icted states. Once an action has been selected, it generates a new
bservation and the perception-action cycle begins again. In what
ollows, we will see how these processes emerge naturally from
he single imperative to minimise (expected) free energy, under a
airly generic model of the world.
As noted above, the generative model includes hidden states
n the past and the future. This enables agents to select policies
hat will maximise model evidence in the future by minimis-
ng expected free energy. Furthermore, it enables learning about
ontingencies based upon state transitions that are inferred retro-
pectively. We  will see that this leads to a Bayes-optimal arbitration
etween epistemic (explorative) and pragmatic (exploitative)
ehaviour that is formally related to several established constructs;
.g., the Infomax principle (Linsker, 1990), Bayesian surprise (Itti
nd Baldi, 2009), the value of information (Howard, 1966), arti-
cial curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991), expected utility theory (Zak,
004) and so on. We  start by describing the generative model upon
hich predictions and actions are based. We  then describe how
ction is speciﬁed by (Bayesian model averages of) beliefs about
tates of the world, under different models or policies. This sec-
ion concludes by considering the optimisation of these beliefs (i.e.,
nference and learning) through Bayesian belief updating. The third
ection illustrates the formalism of the current section, using an
ntuitive example.
otation. The parameters of categorical distributions over
iscrete states s ∈ {0, 1} are denoted by column vectors of expecta-
ions s ∈ {0, 1}, while the ∼ notation denotes sequences of variables
ver time; e.g., s˜ = (s1, . . .,  sT ). The entropy of a probability distri-
ution P(s) = Pr(S = s) is denoted by H(S) = H[P(s)] = EP[− ln P(s)],
hile the relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
s denoted by D[Q (s)||P(s)] = EQ [ln Q (s) − ln P(s)]. Inner and outer
roducts are indicated by A · B = ATB, and A ⊗ B = ABT respectively.
e use a hat notation to denote (natural) logarithms.
inally, P(o|s) = Cat(A) implies Pr(o = i|s = j) = Cat(Aij).
eﬁnition. Active inference rests on the tuple (O, P, Q, R, S, T, U):
A ﬁnite set of outcomes O
A ﬁnite set of control states or actions U
A ﬁnite set of hidden states S
A ﬁnite set of time sensitive policies T
A generative process R(o˜, s˜, u˜)  that generates probabilistic out-
comes o ∈ O from (hidden) states s ∈ S and action u ∈ U
A generative model P(o˜, s˜, , ) with parameters , over out-
comes, states and policies  ∈ T , where  ∈ {0, . . .,  K} returns
a sequence of actions ut = (t)
An approximate posterior Q (s˜, , ) = Q (s0|). . .Q (sT |)Q ()Q ()
over states, policies and parameters with expectations
(s0 , . . .,  s

T , , )emarks. The generative process describes transitions among
hidden) states in the world that generate observed outcomes.
hese transitions depend upon actions, which depend on beliefs
bout the next state. In turn, these beliefs are formed using a gen-avioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879 865
erative model of how observations are generated. The generative
model describes what the agent believes about the world, where
beliefs about hidden states and policies are encoded by expecta-
tions. Note the distinction between actions (that are part of the
generative process in the world) and policies (that are part of the
generative model of an agent). This distinction allows actions to be
speciﬁed by beliefs about policies, effectively converting an optimal
control problem into an optimal inference problem (Attias, 2003;
Botvinick and Toussaint, 2012).
2.1. The generative model
The generative model for partially observable Markov decision
processes can be parameterised in a general way  as follows, where
the model parameters are  = {a, b, c, d, e, ˇ}:
(1.a)
(1.b)
(1.c)
(1.d)
(1.e)
The role of each model parameter will be unpacked when we
consider model inversion and worked examples. For reference,
Table 1 provides a brief description of this model’s states and
parameters. The corresponding (approximate) posterior over hid-
den states and parameters x = (s˜, , ) can be expressed in terms of
their expectations x = (s0 , . . .,  sT , , ) and  = (a, b, c, d, e, )
(2)
In this generative model, observations depend only upon the
current state (Eq. (1.a)), while state transitions depend on a pol-
icy or sequence of actions (Eq. (1.b)). This (sequential) policy is
sampled from a Gibbs distribution or softmax function of expected
free energy , with inverse temperature or precision  (Eq.
(1.e)). Here E corresponds to prior beliefs about policies, while G is
the free energy expected under each policy (see below). Crucially,
policies come in two ﬂavours: when  = 0 the state transitions
866 K. Friston et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879
Table  1
Glossary of expressions.
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o not depend on the policy and the next state is always spec-
ﬁed (probabilistically) by the current state (Eq. (1.c)). In other
ords, there is one special policy that, if selected, will generate the
ame state transitions and subsequent actions, irrespective of time
r context. This is the habitual or state-action policy. Conversely,
hen  > 0, transitions depend on a sequential policy that entails
rdered sequences of actions (Eq. (1.b)).
Note that the policy is a random variable that has to be inferred.
n other words, the agent entertains competing hypotheses or mod-
ls of its behaviour, in terms of policies. This contrasts with standard
ormulations, in which one (habitual) policy returns an action as a
unction of each state u = (s), as opposed to time, u = (t). In other
ords, different policies can prescribe different actions from the
ame state, which is not possible under a state-action policy. Note
lso that the approximate posterior is parameterised in terms of
xpected states under each policy. In other words, we assume that
he agent keeps a separate record of expected states – in the past
nd future – for each allowable policy. Essentially, this assumes the
gents have a short term memory for prediction and postdiction.
hen interpreted in the light of hippocampal dynamics, this pro-
ides a simple explanation for phenomena like place-cell responses
nd phase precession (Friston and Buzsaki, 2016). A separate repre-
entation of trajectories for each policy can be thought of in terms of
 saliency map, where each location corresponds to a putative pol-
cy: e.g., a ﬁxation point for the next saccade (Friston et al., 2012b;
irza et al., 2016).
The predictions that guide action are based upon a Bayesian
odel average of policy-speciﬁc states. In other words, policies the
gent considers it is more likely to be pursuing dominate predic-
ions about the next outcome and the ensuing action. Finally, all the
onditional probabilities – including the initial state – are parame-
erised in terms of Dirichlet distributions (FitzGerald et al., 2015b).
he sufﬁcient statistics of these distributions are concentration
arameters that can be regarded as the number of [co]occurrences
ncountered in the past. In other words, they encode the number
f times various combinations of states and outcomes have been
bserved, which specify their probability – and the conﬁdence in
hat probability. In what follows, we ﬁrst describe how actions are
elected, given beliefs about the hidden state of the world and the
olicies currently being pursued. We  will then turn to the more
ifﬁcult problem of optimising the beliefs upon which action is
ased.
.2. Behaviour action and reﬂexes
We  associate action with reﬂexes that minimise the expected
L divergence between the outcomes predicted at the next time
tep and the outcome predicted after each action. Mathematically,
his can be expressed in terms of minimising (outcome) prediction
rrors as follows:
(3)
This formulation of action is considered reﬂexive by analogy tootor reﬂexes that minimise the discrepancy between propriocep-
ive signals (primary afferents) and descending motor commands
r predictions. Heuristically, action realises expected outcomes by
inimising the expected outcome prediction error. Expectationsavioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879 867
about the next outcome therefore enslave behaviour. If we regard
competing policies as models of behaviour, the predicted outcome
is formally equivalent to a Bayesian model average of outcomes,
under posterior beliefs about policies (last equality above).
2.3. Free energy and expected free energy
In active inference, all the heavy lifting is done by minimising
free energy with respect to expectations about hidden states, poli-
cies and parameters. Variational free energy can be expressed as a
function of the approximate posterior in a number of ways:
(4)
where o˜ = (o1, . . .,  ot) denotes observations up until the current
time.
Because KL divergences cannot be less than zero, the penul-
timate equality means that free energy is minimised when the
approximate posterior becomes the true posterior. At this point,
the free energy becomes the negative log evidence for the gen-
erative model (Beal, 2003). This means minimising free energy is
equivalent to maximising model evidence, which is equivalent to
minimising the complexity of accurate explanations for observed
outcomes (last equality).
With this equivalence in mind, we now turn to the prior beliefs
about policies that shape posterior beliefs − and the Bayesian model
averaging that determines action. Minimising free energy with
respect to expectations ensures that they encode posterior beliefs,
given observed outcomes. However, beliefs about policies rest on
outcomes in the future, because these beliefs determine action and
action determines subsequent outcomes. This means that policies
should, a priori, minimise the free energy of beliefs about the future.
Eq. (1.e) expresses this formally by making the log probability of a
policy proportional to the free energy expected under that policy.
The expected free energy of a policy follows from Eq. (4) (Friston
et al., 2015).(5)
where Q˜ = Q (o, s |) = P(o |s)Q (s |) ≈ P(o, s |o˜, ) and
Q (o |s, ) = P(o |s).
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In the expected free energy, relative entropy becomes mutual
nformation and log-evidence becomes the log-evidence expected
nder the predicted outcomes. If we associate the log prior over
utcomes with utility or prior preferences: U(o) = ln P(o), the
xpected free energy can also be expressed in terms of epistemic
nd extrinsic value. This means extrinsic value corresponds to
xpected utility and can be associated with the log-evidence for
n agent’s model of the world expected in the future. Epistemic
alue is simply the expected information gain (mutual informa-
ion) afforded to hidden states by future outcomes (or vice-versa).
 ﬁnal re-arrangement shows that complexity becomes expected
ost; namely, the KL divergence between the posterior predic-
ions and prior preferences; while accuracy becomes the accuracy,
xpected under predicted outcomes (i.e. negative ambiguity). This
ast equality shows how expected free energy can be evaluated rel-
tively easily: it is just the divergence between the predicted and
referred outcomes, minus the ambiguity (i.e., entropy) expected
nder predicted states.
In summary, expected free energy is deﬁned in relation to prior
eliefs about future outcomes. These deﬁne the expected cost or
omplexity and complete the generative model. It is these pref-
rences that lend inference and action a purposeful or pragmatic
goal directed) aspect. There are several useful interpretations of
xpected free energy that appeal to (and contextualise) established
onstructs. For example, maximising epistemic value is equivalent
o maximising (expected) Bayesian surprise (Schmidhuber, 1991;
tti and Baldi, 2009), where Bayesian surprise is the KL divergence
etween posterior and prior beliefs. This can also be interpreted in
erms of the principle of maximum mutual information or min-
mum redundancy (Barlow, 1961; Linsker, 1990; Olshausen and
ield, 1996; Laughlin, 2001). This is because epistemic value is
he mutual information between hidden states and observations.
n other words, it reports the reduction in uncertainty about hid-
en states afforded by observations. Because the KL divergence (or
nformation gain) cannot be less than zero, it disappears when the
predictive) posterior is not informed by new observations. Heuris-
ically, this means epistemic policies will search out observations
hat resolve uncertainty about the state of the world (e.g., foraging
o locate a prey). However, when there is no posterior uncertainty
 and the agent is conﬁdent about the state of the world – there
an be no further information gain and epistemic value will be the
ame for all policies.
When there are no preferences, the most likely policies max-
mise uncertainty or expected information over outcomes (i.e.,
eep options open), in accord with the maximum entropy prin-
iple (Jaynes, 1957); while minimising the entropy of outcomes,
iven the state. Heuristically, this means agents will try to avoid
ninformative (low entropy) outcomes (e.g., closing one’s eyes),
hile avoiding states that produce ambiguous (high entropy) out-
omes (e.g., a noisy restaurant) (Schwartenbeck et al., 2013). This
esolution of uncertainty is closely related to satisfying artiﬁcial
uriosity (Schmidhuber, 1991; Still and Precup, 2012) and speaks
o the value of information (Howard, 1966). It is also referred to as
ntrinsic value: see (Barto et al., 2004) for discussion of intrinsically
otivated learning. Epistemic value can be regarded as the drive
or novelty seeking behaviour (Wittmann et al., 2008; Krebs et al.,
009; Schwartenbeck et al., 2013), in which we anticipate the res-
lution of uncertainty (e.g., opening a birthday present). See also
Barto et al., 2013).
The expected complexity or cost is exactly the same quantity
inimised in risk sensitive or KL control (Klyubin et al., 2005; van
en Broek et al., 2010), and underpins related (free energy) formu-
ations of bounded rationality based on complexity costs (Braun
t al., 2011; Ortega and Braun, 2013). In other words, minimising
xpected complexity renders behaviour risk-sensitive, while max-
mising expected accuracy renders behaviour ambiguity-sensitive.avioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879
Although the above expressions appear complicated, expected
free energy can be expressed in a compact and simple form in terms
of the generative model:
(6)
The two terms in the expression for expected free energy repre-
sent risk and ambiguity sensitive contributions respectively, where
utility is a vector of preferences over outcomes. The decomposition
of expected free energy in terms of expected cost and ambiguity
lends a formal meaning to risk and ambiguity: risk is the relative
entropy or uncertainty about outcomes, in relation to preferences,
while ambiguity is the uncertainty about outcomes in relation to
the state of the world. This is largely consistent with the use of risk
and ambiguity in economics (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Zak,
2004; Knutson and Bossaerts, 2007; Preuschoff et al., 2008), where
ambiguity reﬂects uncertainty about the context (e.g., which lottery
is currently in play).
In summary, the above formalism suggests that expected free
energy can be carved in two complementary ways: it can be
decomposed into a mixture of epistemic and extrinsic value,
promoting explorative, novelty-seeking and exploitative, reward-
seeking behaviour respectively. Equivalently, minimising expected
free energy can be formulated as minimising a mixture of expected
cost or risk and ambiguity. This completes our description of free
energy. We  now turn to belief updating that is based on minimising
free energy under the generative model described above.
2.4. Belief updating
Belief updating mediates inference and learning, where infer-
ence means optimising expectations about hidden states (policies
and precision), while learning refers to optimising model param-
eters. This optimisation entails ﬁnding the sufﬁcient statistics of
posterior beliefs that minimise variational free energy. These solu-
tions are (see Appendix A):(7)
For notational simplicity, we  have used:

B =

B(()),

B0 =

C,

D = B0 s0 ,  = 1/ and 0 = (

E −  · G).
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Usually, in variational Bayes, one would iterate the above self-
onsistent equations until convergence. However, we  can also
btain the solution in a robust and biologically more plausible fash-
on by using a gradient descent on free energy (see Friston et al.,
nder review): Solving these equations produces posterior expec-
ations that minimise free energy to provide Bayesian estimates
f hidden variables. This means that expectations change over sev-
ral timescales: a fast timescale that updates posterior beliefs about
idden states after each observation (to minimise free energy over
eristimulus time) and a slower timescale that updates posterior
eliefs as new observations are sampled (to mediate evidence accu-
ulation over observations); see also (Penny et al., 2013). Finally, at
he end of each sequence of observations (i.e., trial of observation
pochs) the expected (concentration) parameters are updated to
ediate learning over trials. These updates are remarkably simple
nd have intuitive (neurobiological) interpretations:
Updating hidden states correspond to state estimation,  under
ach policy. Because each expectation is informed by expecta-
ions about past and future states, this scheme has the form of a
ayesian smoother that combines (empirical) prior expectations
bout hidden states with the likelihood of the current observation.
aving said this, the scheme does not use conventional forward and
ackward sweeps, because all future and past states are encoded
xplicitly. In other words, representations always refer to the same
idden state at the same time in relation to the start of the trial
 not in relation to the current time. This may  seem counterin-
uitive but this form of spatiotemporal (place and time) encoding
nesses belief updating considerably and has a degree of plausibil-
ty in relation to empirical ﬁndings, as discussed elsewhere (Friston
nd Buzsaki, 2016).
The policy updates are just a softmax function of their log prob-
bility, which has three components: a prior based on previous
xperience, the (posterior) free energy based on past outcomes
nd the expected (prior) free energy based on preferences about
uture outcomes. Note that prior beliefs about policies in the gener-
tive model are supplemented or informed by the (posterior) free
nergy based on outcomes. Because habits are just another pol-
cy, the arbitration among habits and (sequential) policies rests on
heir posterior probability, which is closely related to the propos-
ls in (Daw et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014) but introduces a risk and
mbiguity trade-off in policy selection (FitzGerald et al., 2014). Pol-
cy selection also entails the optimisation of expected uncertainty
r precision. This is expressed above in terms of the temperature
inverse precision) of posterior beliefs about precision:  ˇ = 1/ .
ne can see that temperature increases with expected free energy.
n other words, policies that, on average, have a high expected
ree energy will inﬂuence posterior beliefs about policies with less
recision.
Interestingly, the updates to temperature (and implicitly preci-
ion) are determined by the difference between the expected free
nergy under posterior beliefs about policies and the expected free
nergy under prior beliefs. This endorses the notion of reward pre-
iction errors as an explanation for dopamine responses; in the
ense that if posterior beliefs based upon current observations
educe the expected free energy, relative to prior beliefs, then
recision will increase (FitzGerald et al., 2015a, 2015b). This can
e related to dopamine discharges that have been interpreted in
erms of changes in expected reward (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000;
iorillo et al., 2003). The role of the neuromodulator dopamine in
ncoding precision is also consistent with its multiplicative effect
n the second update – to nuance the selection among competing
olicies (Fiorillo et al., 2003; Frank et al., 2007; Humphries et al.,
009, 2012; Solway and Botvinick, 2012; Mannella and Baldassarre,
015). We  will return to this later.
Finally, the updates for the parameters bear a marked resem-
lance to classical Hebbian plasticity (Abbott and Nelson, 2000).avioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879 869
The transition or connectivity updates comprise two terms: an
associative term that is a digamma function of the accumu-
lated coincidence of past (postsynaptic) and current (presynaptic)
states (or observations under hidden causes) and a decay term
that reduces each connection as the total afferent connectivity
increases. The associative and decay terms are strictly increasing
but saturating functions of the concentration parameters. Note
that the updates for the (connectivity) parameters accumulate
coincidences over time because, unlike hidden states, parameters
are time invariant. Furthermore, the parameters encoding state
transitions have associative terms that are modulated by policy
expectations. In addition to the learning of contingencies through
the parameters of the transition matrices, the vectors encoding
beliefs about the initial state and selected policy accumulate evi-
dence by simply counting the number of times they occur. In other
words, if a particular state or policy is encountered frequently, it
will come to dominate posterior expectations. This mediates con-
text learning (in terms of the initial state) and habit learning (in terms
of policy selection). In practice, the learning updates are performed
at the end of each trial or sequence of observations. This ensures
that learning beneﬁts from inferred (postdicted) states, after ambi-
guity has been resolved through epistemic behaviour. For example,
the agent can learn about the initial state, even if the initial cues
were completely ambiguous.
2.5. Summary
By assuming a generic (Markovian) form for the generative
model, it is fairly easy to derive Bayesian updates that clarify the
relationships between perception, policy selection, precision and
action – and how these quantities shape beliefs about hidden states
of the world and subsequent behaviour. In brief, the agent ﬁrst
infers the hidden states under each model or policy that it enter-
tains. It then evaluates the evidence for each policy based upon
prior beliefs or preferences about future outcomes. Having opti-
mised the precision or conﬁdence in beliefs about policies, they
are used to form a Bayesian model average of the next outcome,
which is realised through action. The anatomy of the implicit mes-
sage passing is not inconsistent with functional anatomy in the
brain: see (Friston et al., 2014) and Figs. 1 and 2. Fig. 2 reproduces
the (solutions to) belief updating and assigns them to plausi-
ble brain structures. This functional anatomy rests on reciprocal
message passing among expected policies (e.g., in the striatum)
and expected precision (e.g., in the substantia nigra). Expectations
about policies depend upon expected outcomes and states of the
world (e.g., in the prefrontal cortex (Mushiake et al., 2006) and hip-
pocampus (Pezzulo et al., 2014; Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016; Stoianov
et al., 2016)). Crucially, this scheme entails reciprocal interactions
between the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia (Botvinick and An,
2008; Pennartz et al., 2011; Verschure et al., 2014); in particu-
lar, selection of expected (motor) outcomes by the basal ganglia
(Mannella and Baldassarre, 2015). In the next section, we  consider
the formal relationships between active inference and conventional
schemes based upon value functions.
3. Relationship to Bellman formulations
Hitherto, we have assumed that habits are based upon learned
state transitions. However, it is possible that these transitions
could be evaluated directly, under the assumption that an opti-
mal  (state-action) policy will be adopted in the future. Dynamic
programming or backwards induction is the standard approach to
optimising state-action policies under this assumption (Bellman,
870 K. Friston et al. / Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879
Fig. 2. Overview of belief updates for discrete Markovian models: the left panel lists the solutions in the main text, associating various updates with action, perception, policy
selection, precision and learning. The right panel assigns the variables (sufﬁcient statistics or expectations) to various brain areas to illustrate a rough functional anatomy
–  implied by the form of the belief updates. Observed outcomes are signed to visual representations in the occipital cortex. State estimation has been associated with the
hippocampal formation and cerebellum (or parietal cortex and dorsal striatum) for planning and habits respectively (Everitt and Robbins, 2013). The evaluation of policies,
in  terms of their (expected) free energy, has been placed in the ventral prefrontal cortex. Expectations about policies per se and the precision of these beliefs have been
assigned  to striatal and ventral tegmental areas to indicate a putative role for dopamine in encoding precision. Finally, beliefs about policies are used to create Bayesian model
averages of future states (over policies) – that are fulﬁlled by action. The blue arrows denote message passing, while the solid red line indicates a modulatory weighting that
implements Bayesian model averaging. The broken red lines indicate the updates for parameters or connectivity (in blue circles) that depend on expectations about hidden
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states  (e.g., associative plasticity in the cerebellum). Please see the appendix for an
erception cycle, rendering outcomes dependent upon action. (For interpretation o
f  this article.)
952; Howard, 1960). We  can express dynamic programming using
he above notation as follows:
(8)
The ﬁrst pair of equations represents the two steps of dynamic
rogramming. The second set of equations expresses the optimal
olicy in terms of our generative model, where Bs denotes the col-
mn  of the matrix encoding the transitions from state s. In brief, the
ptimal policy returns the action that maximises utility U(s) ∈ U
lus a value-function of states V(s) ∈ V. The value-function is
hen evaluated under the optimal policy, until convergence. The
alue-function represents the expected utility (cf., prior prefer-
nce) integrated over future states. The close relationship between
ynamic programming and backwards induction is highlighted by
he ﬁnal expression for value, which is effectively the utility over
tates propagated backwards in time by the optimal (habitual) tran-
ition matrix.anation of the equations and variables. The large blue arrow completes the action
references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version
Dynamic programming supposes that there is an optimal action
that can be taken from every state, irrespective of the context or
time of action. This is, of course, the same assumption implicit in
habit learning − and we might expect to see a correspondence
between the state transitions encoded by C = B0 and B (we  will
return to this in the last section). However, this correspondence will
only arise when the (Bellman) assumptions of dynamic program-
ming or backwards induction hold; i.e., when states are observed
unambiguously, such that o = s and U(o) = U(s) ∈ U. In these cases,
one can also use variational belief updating to identify the best
action from any state. This is the action associated with the policy
that minimises expected free energy, starting from any state:(9)
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Fig. 3. The generative model used to simulate foraging in a three-arm maze (insert on the upper right). This model contains four control states that encode movement to
one  of four locations (three arms and a central location). These control the transition probabilities among hidden states that have a tensor product form with two  factors:
the  ﬁrst is place (one of four locations), while the second is one of two  contexts. These correspond to the location of rewarding (red) outcomes and the associated cues (blue
or  green circles). Each of the eight hidden states generates an observable outcome, where the ﬁrst two  hidden states generate the same outcome that just tells the agent
that  it is at the center. Some selected transitions are shown as arrows, indicating that control states attract the agent to different locations, where outcomes are sampled.
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the  equations deﬁne the generative model in terms of its parameters (A,B), which 
ower  vector corresponds to prior preferences; namely, the agent expects to ﬁnd a r
o  colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this artic
This effectively composes a state-action policy by picking the
ction under the best policy from each state (assuming the current
tate is known). The key point here is that dynamic programming is
 special case of this variational scheme. One can see this by substi-
uting the expression for value above into the ﬁrst step of dynamic
rogramming. This is known as direct policy iteration (Williams,
992; Baxter et al., 2001). The ensuing policy iteration scheme can
ow be expressed, not in terms of value, but in terms of future
tates.
(10)
This is formally equivalent to the variational state-action pol-
cy with two differences. First, the policy iteration scheme simply
aximises expected utility, as opposed to expected free energy.
his means the risk and ambiguity terms disappear and free energy
educes to expected utility. The second difference pertains to the
ecursive iteration of future states: active inference uses variational
pdates to implement Bayesian smoothing, whereas the backward
nduction scheme imputes future states by recursive application of
he optimal transition matrix.e mappings from hidden states to outcomes and state transitions respectively. The
. Here, ⊗ denotes a Kronecker tensor product. (For interpretation of the references
One might question the relative merits of iteratively evaluating
the value-function of states (Eq. (8)), as opposed to the states per
se (Eq, (10)). Clearly, if one wants to deal with risk and ambiguity,
then an evaluation of the states (and their entropy) is neces-
sary. In other words, if one wants to augment conventional utility
functions with risk and ambiguity terms, it becomes necessary
to evaluate beliefs about future states (as in Eq. (10)). This has
a profound implication for schemes (such as dynamic program-
ming, backwards induction and reinforcement learning) based on
value functions. These schemes are, in essence, belief-free because
the construction of value functions precludes a contribution from
beliefs about the future (unless one uses a belief MDP). This is a
key difference between (belief-based) active inference and (belief-
free) schemes based upon the Bellman assumptions. In summary,
belief-free schemes are limited to situations in which there is no
ambiguity about hidden states (which are difﬁcult to conceive in
most interesting or real-world settings). We  will see an example of
this limitation in the next section. This completes our theoretical
treatment of active inference and learning. In the last section, we
use simulations to revisit some key concepts above.
4. Simulations of foraging
This section considers inference and learning using simulations
of foraging in a T-maze. This T-maze contains primary rewards
(such as food) and cues that are not rewarding per se but disclose
the location of rewards. The basic principles of this problem can
be applied to any number of scenarios (e.g., saccadic eye move-
ments to visual targets). This is the same setup used in (Friston
et al., 2015) and is as simple as possible, while illustrating some
key behaviours. Crucially, this example can also be interpreted in
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timate panel shows the accumulated posterior expectations about
the initial state D, while the lower panels show the posterior expec-
tations of habitual state transitions, C. The implicit learning reﬂects72 K. Friston et al. / Neuroscience and B
erms of responses elicited in reinforcement learning paradigms by
nconditioned (US) and conditioned (CS) stimuli. Strictly speaking,
ur paradigm is instrumental and the cue is a discriminative stim-
lus; however, we will retain the Pavlovian nomenclature, when
elating precision updates to dopaminergic discharges.
.1. The setup
An agent (e.g., a rat) starts in the center of a T-maze, where either
he right or left arms are baited with a reward (US). The lower arm
ontains a discriminative cue (CS) that tells the animal whether the
eward is in the upper right or left arm. Crucially, the agent can only
ake two moves. Furthermore, the agent cannot leave the baited
rms after they are entered. This means that the optimal behaviour
s to ﬁrst go to the lower arm to ﬁnd where the reward is located
nd then retrieve the reward at the cued location.
In terms of a Markov decision process, there are four control
tates that correspond to visiting, or sampling, the four locations
the center and three arms). For simplicity, we assume that each
ction takes the agent to the associated location (as opposed to
oving in a particular direction from the current location). This
s analogous to place-based navigation strategies thought to be
ediated by the hippocampus (Moser et al., 2008). There are eight
idden states: four locations times, two contexts (right and left
eward) and seven possible outcomes. The outcomes correspond
o being in the center of the maze plus the (two) outcomes at each
f the (three) arms that are determined by the context (the right or
eft arm is more rewarding).
Having speciﬁed the state-space, it is now necessary to spec-
fy the (A,B) matrices encoding contingencies. These are shown in
ig. 3, where the A matrix maps from hidden states to outcomes,
elivering an ambiguous cue at the center (ﬁrst) location and a
eﬁnitive cue at the lower (fourth) location. The remaining loca-
ions provide a reward (or not) with probability p = 98% depending
pon the context. The B(u) matrices encode action-speciﬁc transi-
ions, with the exception of the baited (second and third) locations,
hich are (absorbing) hidden states that the agent cannot leave.
One could consider learning contingencies by updating the prior
oncentration parameters (a, b) of the transition matrices but we
ill assume the agent knows (i.e., has very precise beliefs about)
he contingencies. This corresponds to making the prior concentra-
ion parameters very large. Conversely, we will use small values of
c, d) to enable habit and context learning respectively. The param-
ters encoding prior expectations about policies (e) will be used
o preclude (this section) or permit (next section) the selection of
abitual policies. Preferences in the vector U = ln P(o) encode the
tility of outcomes. Here, the utilities of a rewarding and unreward-
ng outcome were 3 and −3 respectively (and zero otherwise). This
eans, the agent expects to be rewarded exp(3) ≈ 20 times more
han experiencing a neutral outcome. Note that utility is always rel-
tive and has a quantitative meaning in terms of preferred states.
his is important because it endows utility with the same measure
s information; namely, nats (i.e., units of information or entropy
ased on natural logarithms). This highlights the close connection
etween value and information.
Having speciﬁed the state-space and contingencies, one can
olve the belief updating equations (Eq. (7)) to simulate behaviour.
he (concentration) parameters of the habits were initialised to the
um of all transition probabilities: c =
∑
uB(u). Prior beliefs about
he initial state were initialised to d = 8 for the central location for
ach context and zero otherwise. Finally, prior beliefs about poli-
ies were initialised to e = 4 with the exception of the habit, where
 = 0. These concentration parameters can be regarded as the num-
er of times each state, transition or policy has been encountered
n previous trials.avioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879
Fig. 4 summarises the (simulated) behavioural and physiologi-
cal responses over 32 successive trials using a format that will be
adopted in subsequent ﬁgures. Each trial comprises two actions
following an initial observation. The top panel shows the initial
states on each trial (as coloured circles) and subsequent policy
selection (in image format) over the 11 policies considered. The
ﬁrst 10 (allowable) policies correspond to staying at the center and
then moving to each of the four locations, moving to the left or
right arm and staying there, or moving to the lower arm and then
moving to each of the four locations. The 11th policy corresponds
to a habit (i.e., state-action policy). The red line shows the poste-
rior probability of selecting the habit, which is effectively zero in
these simulations because we  set its prior (concentration parame-
ter) to zero. The second panel reports the ﬁnal outcomes (encoded
by coloured circles) and performance. Performance is reported in
terms of preferred outcomes, summed over time (black bars) and
reaction times (cyan dots). Note that because preferences are log
probabilities they are always negative – and the best outcome is
zero.2 The reaction times here are based upon the processing time
in the simulations (using the Matlab tic-toc facility) and are shown
after normalisation to a mean of zero and standard deviation of one.
In this example, the ﬁrst couple of trials alternate between the
two contexts with rewards on the right and left. After this, the con-
text (indicated by the cue) remained unchanged. For the ﬁrst 20
trials, the agent selects epistemic policies, ﬁrst going to the lower
arm and then proceeding to the reward location (i.e., left for policy
#8 and right for policy #9). After this, the agent becomes increas-
ingly conﬁdent about the context and starts to visit the reward
location directly. The differences in performance between these
(epistemic and pragmatic) behaviours are revealed in the second
panel as a decrease in reaction time and an increase in the aver-
age utility. This increase follows because the average is over trials
and the agent spends two  trials enjoying its preferred outcome,
when seeking reward directly – as opposed to one trial when
behaving epistemically. Note that on trial 12, the agent received
an unexpected (null) outcome that induces a degree of posterior
uncertainty about which policy it was pursuing. This is seen as
a non-trivial posterior probability for three policies: the correct
(context-sensitive) epistemic policy and the best alternatives that
involve staying in the lower arm or returning to the center.
The third panel shows a succession of simulated event related
potentials following each outcome. These are the rate of change
of neuronal activity, encoding the expected probability of hidden
states. The fourth panel shows phasic ﬂuctuations in posterior pre-
cision that can be interpreted in terms of dopamine responses.
Here, the phasic component of simulated dopamine responses cor-
responds to the rate of change of precision (multiplied by eight)
and the tonic component to the precision per se (divided by eight).
The phasic part is the precision prediction error (cf., reward predic-
tion error: see Eq. (8)). These simulated responses reveal a phasic
response to the cue (CS) during epistemic trials that emerges with
context learning over repeated trials. This reﬂects an implicit trans-
fer of dopamine responses from the US to the CS. When the reward
(US) is accessed directly there is a profound increase in the phasic
response, relative to the response elicited after it has been predicted
by the CS.
The ﬁnal two panels show context and habit learning: the penul-2 Utilities can only be speciﬁed to within an additive constant (the log normali-
sation constant) because of the sum to one constraint of probabilities. This means
that although preferred outcomes were speciﬁed with utilities between −3 and +3,
the actual utilities are negative.
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Fig. 4. Simulated responses over 32 trials: this ﬁgure reports the behavioural and (simulated) physiological responses during successive trials. The ﬁrst panel shows, for each
trial,  the initial state (as blue and red circles indicating the context) and the selected policy (in image format) over the 11 policies considered. The policies are selected in the
ﬁrst  two  trials correspond to epistemic policies (#8 and #9), which involve examining the cue in the lower arm and then going to the left or right arm to secure the reward
(depending on the context). After the agent becomes sufﬁciently conﬁdent that the context does not change (after trial 21) it indulges in pragmatic behaviour, accessing the
reward directly. The red line shows the posterior ability of selecting the habit, which is was set to zero in these simulations. The second panel reports the ﬁnal outcomes
(encoded by coloured circles: cyan and blue for rewarding outcomes in the left and right arms) and performance measures in terms of preferred outcomes, summed over time
(black  bars) and reaction times (cyan dots). The third panel shows a succession of simulated event related potentials following each outcome. These are taken to be the rate
of  change of neuronal activity, encoding the expected probability of hidden states. The fourth panel shows phasic ﬂuctuations in posterior precision that can be interpreted
in  terms of dopamine responses. The ﬁnal two panels show context and habit learning, expressed in terms of (C,D): the penultimate panel shows the accumulated posterior
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teliefs  about the initial state, while the lower panels show the posterior expectatio
he  eight hidden states (see Fig. 3), where each column encodes the probability of m
esponses. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the r
n accumulation of evidence that the reward will be found in the
ame location. In other words, initially ambiguous priors over the
rst two hidden states come to reﬂect the agent’s experience that
t always starts in the ﬁrst hidden state. It is this context learn-
ng that underlies the pragmatic behaviour in later trials. We  talk
bout context learning (as opposed to inference) because, strictly
peaking, Bayesian updates to model parameters (between trials)
re referred to as learning, while updates to hidden states (within
rial) correspond to inference.habitual state transitions. Here, each panel shows the expected transitions among
 from one state to another. Please see main text for a detailed description of these
is referred to the web version of this article.)
Finally, the expected state transitions under a habitual policy
show the emergence of an epistemic policy, in which the agent
always goes to the lower (fourth) location from the central (ﬁrst)
location, irrespective of context. It then locates the appropriate
(second or third) locations. It is more conﬁdent about vicarious
transitions to the second location, because these predominate in
its recent experience. The next section considers learning in more
detail, looking ﬁrst at context learning and then habit learning.
8 iobeh
5
l
i
f
s
e
w
d
p
s
f
a
5
i
6
r
u
c
l
i
(
n
p
c
p
w
a
i
p
r
t
ﬁ
w
a
e
T
e
p
a
i
a
t
a
o
b
5
h
v
h
a
e
c
i
b
t
t74 K. Friston et al. / Neuroscience and B
. Simulations of learning
This section illustrates the distinction between context and habit
earning. In the previous section, context learning enabled more
nformed and conﬁdent (pragmatic) behaviour as the agent became
amiliar with its environment. In this section, we consider how the
ame context learning can lead to perseveration and thereby inﬂu-
nce reversal learning, when contingencies change. Following this,
e turn to habit learning and simulate some cardinal aspects of
evaluation. Finally, we turn to epistemic habits and close by com-
aring an acquired with and without ambiguous outcomes. This
erves to highlight the difference between belief-based and belief-
ree schemes – and illustrates the convergence of active inference
nd belief-free schemes, when the world is fully observed.
.1. Context and reversal learning
Fig. 5 uses the format of Fig. 4 to illustrate behavioural and phys-
ological responses induced by reversal learning. In this example,
4 trials were simulated with a switch in context to a (consistent)
eward location from the left to the right arm after 32 trials. The
pper panel shows that after about 16 trials the agent is sufﬁ-
iently conﬁdent about the context to go straight to the rewarding
ocation; thereby switching from an epistemic to a pragmatic pol-
cy. Prior to this switch, phasic dopamine responses to the reward
US) progressively diminish and are transferred to the discrimi-
ative cue (CS) (Fiorillo et al., 2003). After adopting a pragmatic
olicy, dopamine responses to the US disappear because they are
ompletely predictable and afford no further increase in precision.
Crucially, after 32 trials the context changes but the (pragmatic)
olicy persists, leading to 4 trials in which the agent goes to the
rong location. After this, it reverts to an epistemic policy and,
fter a period of context learning, adopts a new pragmatic pol-
cy. Behavioural perseveration of this sort is mediated purely by
rior beliefs about context that accumulate over trials. Here, this is
eﬂected in the prior belief about the hidden states encountered at
he beginning of each new trial (shown as a function of trials in the
fth panel). This context learning is illustrated in the right panel,
hich shows the number of perseverative trials before reversal, as
 function of previous exposures to the original context.
Note that this form of reversal learning reﬂects changes in prior
xpectations about the hidden states generating the ﬁrst outcome.
his should be contrasted with learning a reversal of contingencies
ncoded by the state transition parameters, or parameters map-
ing from states to outcomes. Learning these parameters would
lso produce reversal learning and a number of other phenomena
n psychology; such as effect of partial reinforcement (Delamater
nd Westbrook, 2014). However, in this paper, we  focus on con-
ext and habit learning; as opposed to contingency learning. The
bove demonstration of reversal learning proceeded in the absence
f habits. In the remaining simulations, we enabled habit learning
y allowing its (concentration) parameter to accumulate over trials.
.2. Habit formation and devaluation
Fig. 6 uses the same format as the previous ﬁgure to illustrate
abit formation and the effects of devaluation. Devaluation pro-
ides a critical test for dissociable (goal-directed or contingency and
abitual or incentive) learning mechanisms in psychology (Balleine
nd Dickinson, 1998; Yin and Knowlton, 2006). The left-hand pan-
ls show habit learning over 64 trials in which the context was held
onstant. The posterior probability of the habitual policy is shown
n the upper panel (solid red line), where the habit is underwritten
y the state transitions in the lower panels. This simulation shows
hat as habitual transitions are learnt, the posterior probability of
he habit increases until it is executed routinely. In this case, theavioral Reviews 68 (2016) 862–879
acquired habit corresponds to an epistemic policy (policy #8), and
after the habit has been acquired, there is no opportunity for prag-
matic policies. This means that although the behaviour is efﬁcient
in terms of reaction times, the habit has precluded exploitative
behaviour (Dayan et al., 2006). The reason why this habit has epis-
temic components is because it was learned under prior beliefs
that both contexts were equally likely; conversely, a habit acquired
under a different prior could be pragmatic.
One might ask why  a habit is selected over a sequential pol-
icy that predicts the same behaviour. The habit is selected because
it provides a better explanation for observed outcomes. This is
because the joint distribution over successive states is encoded by
the concentration parameters c ⊂  (see Eq. (6)). Technically, this
means that habits have less complexity and free energy path inte-
grals. One can see this anecdotally in the transition matrices on the
lower left of Fig. 6: if we were in the seventh state after the ﬁrst
move, we can be almost certain we started in the ﬁrst state. How-
ever, under the model of transitions provided by the best sequential
policy (policy #8), the empirical prior afforded by knowing we  were
in the seventh state is less deﬁnitive (we  could have moved from
the ﬁrst state or we could have already been in the seventh).
During the acquisition of the habit, the reaction times decrease
with maintained performance and systematic changes in phasic
dopamine responses (fourth panel). An important correlate of habit
learning is the attenuation of electrophysiological responses (e.g.,
in the hippocampus). This reﬂects the fact that the equivalent
belief updates for the habit (e.g., in the cerebellum, parietal cortex
and dorsolateral striatum (Everitt and Robbins, 2013)), have been
deliberately omitted from the graphics. This effective transfer of
sequential processing (from hippocampus to cerebellar cortex) may
provide a simple explanation for the putative transfer in real brains
during memory consolidation; for example, during sleep (Buzsaki,
1998; Kesner, 2000; Pezzulo et al., 2014).
Crucially, after the habit was acquired the reward was  devalued
by switching the prior preferences (at trial 48), such that the neu-
tral outcome became the preferred outcome (denoted by the green
shaded areas). Despite this switch, the habit persists and, indeed,
reinforces itself with repeated executions. The right panels report
exactly the same simulation when the rewards were devalued after
16 trials, before the habit was  fully acquired. In this instance, the
agent switches its behaviour immediately (before sampling the
devalued outcome) and subsequently acquires a habit that is con-
sistent with its preferences (compare the transition probabilities
in the lower panels). In other words, prior to habit formation, goal
directed behaviour is sensitive to devaluation – a sensitivity that
is lost under habitual control. These simulations demonstrate the
resistance of habitual policies to devaluation resulting in subopti-
mal  performance (but faster reaction times: see second panel). See
Dayan et al. (2006) for a discussion of how habits can confound
learning in this way.
5.3. Epistemic habit acquisition under ambiguity
Fig. 7 illustrates the acquisition of epistemic habits under
ambiguous (left panels) and unambiguous (right panels) outcome
contingencies. In these simulations, the context switches randomly
from one trial to the next. The left panels show the rapid acquisition
of an epistemic habit after about 16 trials of epistemic cue-seeking.
As the agent observes its own habitual behaviour, the prior proba-
bility of the habit increases (dotted red line in the upper panel). This
prior probability is based upon the policy concentration param-
eters, e ⊂ . The lower panels show the state transitions under
the habitual policy; properly enforcing a visit to the cue location
followed by appropriate reward seeking.
This policy should be contrasted with the so-called optimal
policy provided by dynamic programming (and the equivalent vari-
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Fig. 5. Reversal learning: this ﬁgure uses the format of Fig. 4 to illustrate behavioural and physiological responses induced by reversal learning. In this example, 64 trials
were  simulated with a switch in context from one (consistent) reward location to another. The upper panel shows that after about 16 trials the agent is sufﬁciently conﬁdent
about  the context to go straight to the rewarding location; thereby switching from an epistemic to a pragmatic policy. After 32 trials the context changes but the (pragmatic)
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bolicy  persists; leading to 4 trials in which the agent goes to the wrong location. A
 new pragmatic policy. Behavioural perseveration of this sort is mediated purely 
anel,  which shows the number of perseverations after reversal, as a function of th
tional estimate) in the lower panels: these are the solutions to
qs. (9) and (10). Clearly, the ‘optimal’ policy is to go straight to
he rewarding location in each context (or hidden state); however,
his is no use when outcomes are ambiguous and the agent does
ot know which context it is in. This means the optimal (epistemic)
tate-action policy under active inference (left panel) is fundamen-
ally different from the optimal (pragmatic) habit under dynamic
rogramming (right panel). This distinction can be dissolved by
aking the outcomes unambiguous. The right panels report the
esults of an identical simulation with one important difference
 the outcomes observed from the starting location unambigu-
usly specify the context. In this instance, all state-action policies
re formally identical (although transitions from the cue location
re not evaluated under active inference, because they are never
ncountered).
.4. SummaryIn summary, these simulations suggest that agents should
cquire epistemic habits – and can only do so through belief-
ased learning. There is nothing remarkable about epistemicis, it reverts to an epistemic policy and, after a period of context learning, adopts
or beliefs about context that accumulate over trials. This is illustrated in the right
ber of preceding (consistent) trials.
habits; they are entirely consistent with the classical conception
of habits – in the animal learning literature – as chains of stimulus-
response associations. The key aspect here is that they can be
acquired (autodidactically) via observing epistemic goal-directed
behaviour.
6. Conclusion
We have described an active inference scheme for discrete state-
space models of choice behaviour that is suitable for modelling a
variety of paradigms and phenomena. Although goal-directed and
habitual policies are usually considered in terms of model-based
and model-free schemes, we  ﬁnd the more important distinction is
between belief-free versus belief-based schemes; namely, whether
the current state is sufﬁcient to specify an action or whether it is
necessary to consider beliefs about states (e.g., uncertainty). Fur-
thermore, we show that conventional formulations (based on the
Bellman optimality principle) apply only in the belief-free setting,
when cues are unambiguous. Finally, we show how habits can
emerge naturally from goal-directed behaviour.
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Fig. 6. Habit formation and devaluation: this ﬁgure uses the same format as the previous ﬁgure to illustrate habit formation and the effects of devaluation. The left panels
show habit learning over 64 trials in which the context was  held constant. The posterior probability of the habitual policy is shown in the upper panel (solid red line), where
the  habit is underwritten by the state transitions shown in the lower panels. The simulation shows that as the habitual transitions are learnt, the posterior probability of the
habit  increases until it is executed routinely. After the habit had been acquired, we devalued the reward by switching the prior preferences such that the neutral outcome
became  the preferred outcome (denoted by the green shaded areas). Despite this preference reversal, the habit persists. The right panels report the same simulation when the
r tance,
a  in the
t
f
d
a
l
m
l
m
g
c
i
t
w
i
o
t
p
w
t
deward was devalued after 16 trials, before the habit was fully acquired. In this ins
 habit that is consistent with its preferences (compare the transition probabilities
he  reader is referred to the web  version of this article.)
To the extent that one accepts the variational (active inference)
ormulation of behaviour, there are interesting implications for the
istinction between habitual and goal-directed behaviour. If we
ssociate model-free learning with habit-learning, then model-free
earning emerges from model-based behaviour. In other words,
odel-based planning engenders and contextualises model-free
earning. In this sense, active inference suggests there can be no
odel-free scheme that is learned autonomously or divorced from
oal-directed (model-based) behaviour. There are further impli-
ations for the role of value-functions and backwards induction
n standard approaches to model-based planning. Crucially, varia-
ional formulations do not refer to value-functions of states, even
hen optimising habitual (state-action) policies. Put simply, learn-
ng in active inference corresponds to optimising the parameters
f a generative model. In this instance, the parameters correspond
o state transitions that lead to valuable (preferred) states. At no
oint do we need to learn an intermediary value-function from
hich these transitions are derived. In sum, the important distinc-
ion between goal-directed and habitual behaviour may  not be the
istinction between model-based and model-free but the distinc- the agent switches immediately to the new preference and subsequently acquires
 lower panels). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend,
tion between selecting policies that are and are not sensitive to
context or ambiguity; i.e. belief-based versus belief-free.
One might ask whether active inference makes any predictions
about responses that have yet to be observed empirically. At the
level of behavioural predictions, the answer is probably no. This
follows from something called the complete class theorem (Brown,
1981), which states that for any observed behaviour and utility
function there exists a prior that renders the behaviour Bayes opti-
mal. Because active inference absorbs utility functions into prior
preferences, this means there is always a set of prior preferences
that renders any behaviour (approximately) Bayes optimal. At ﬁrst
glance, this may  seem disappointing; however, turning the argu-
ment on its head, the complete class theorem means that we can
always characterise behaviour in terms of prior preferences. This
is important because it means one can computationally phenotype
any behaviour and start to quantify – and understand – the prior
beliefs that subjects bring to any paradigm. This is a tenet of compu-
tational psychiatry (Huys et al., 2011; Montague et al., 2012; Wang
and Krystal, 2014), which motivates much of the work reported
above.
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Fig. 7. Epistemic habit acquisition under ambiguity: this ﬁgure uses the same format as Fig. 6 to illustrate the acquisition of epistemic habits under ambiguous (left panels)
and  unambiguous (right panels) outcomes. The left panels show the rapid acquisition of an epistemic habit after about 16 trials of epistemic cue-seeking, when the context
switches randomly from one trial to the next. The lower panels show the state transitions under the habitual policy; properly enforcing a visit to the cue location followed by
appropriate reward seeking. This policy should be contrasted with the so-called optimal policy provided by dynamic programming (and the equivalent variational estimate)
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At the level of the particular (neuronal) process theory described
n this paper, there are many predictions about the neuronal cor-
elates of perception, evaluation, policy selection and the encoding
f uncertainty associated with dopaminergic discharges. For exam-
le, the key difference between expected free energy and value is
he epistemic component or information gain. This means that a
trong prediction (which to our knowledge has not yet been tested)
s that a mildly aversive outcome that reduces uncertainty about the
xperimental or environmental context will elicit a positive phasic
opaminergic response.
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lts of an identical simulation, where outcomes observed from the starting location
Appendix A.
Belief updating: variational updates are a self-consistent set of
equalities that minimise variational free energy, which can be
expressed as the (time-dependent) free energy under each policy
plus the complexity incurred by posterior beliefs about (time-
invariant) policies and parameters, where (ignoring constants and
using  = {a, b, c, d, e, ˇ});
8 iobeh
t
t
(
u
R
A78 K. Friston et al. / Neuroscience and B
Free energy and its expectation are given by:
Here,

B =

B(()),

B0 =

C and

B0 s

0 =

D. B(d) is the beta func-
ion of the column vector d and the remaining variables are:
Using the standard result: ∂dB(d) = B(d)

D, we can differentiate
he variational free energy with respect to the sufﬁcient statistics
with a slight abuse of notation and using ∂sF:=∂F(, )/∂s):
Finally, the solutions to these equations give the variational
pdates in the main text (Eq. (7)).eferences
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